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R E P O R T

on

the case of

WALTER FRIEDRICH SCHELLENBERG

Carded under

XX-11885

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PERSONAL PARTICULARS

Friedrich Walter SCHELLENBERG, German national and Roman Catholic. Was born in Saarbruecken 16.1.1910.

FAMILY.

Father: Guido SCHELLENBERG, piano-maker (German)
Mother: Lydia SCHELLENBERG, nee RIEDL, also German. (Deceased.)

Brothers: BERNHARDT, aged ca. 48
married. Wife's maiden
name v. NIESEWAND.

LUDWIG, aged ca. 43,
married. (Wife's maiden
name unknown.)

GUIDO, aged ca 38,
single.

Sisters: CHRISTINA, aged about
50, married name
RIDDERING.

ELISABETH, aged ca. 47
single.

JOHANNA, aged 45/6,
married name KELLER.

ADDRESSES.

Father: Last known to be living at Monzel a/Mosel, Luxembourg, with
daughter ELISABETH.

Wife: Last known to be living at Pension Dachsenberg, Post
Unterwussenbach, Marquardtstein.

SCHELLENBERG's last permanent address: Uferstadt, Babelsberg,
Berlinerstrasse 131.

MARRIAGE.

First wife: Kathe KORTEKAMP, born May 1900. Married 18th May 1938,
divorced November 1939, no children.

Second wife: Irene GROSS-SCHOENEPAUCK, born 8th February 1919.
Married 10th October 1940.

CHILDREN.

INGO (male) born 27th May 1941.

ILKA (female) born September 1942.

SYBILLE (female) born September 1943.

(Note: SCHELLENBERG anticipated the birth of a fourth child to his
present wife in the course of August 1945.)

FOREWORD

The information contained in this report has been obtained principally through direct interrogation. With regard to that part of SCHELLENBERG's story, however, which deals with his efforts in the peace negotiations of the last few weeks before capitulation, SCHELLENBERG's autobiographical statement, supplemented by further interrogation where necessary, has been used as a basis. This account of the events of that time was written in Sweden shortly after the surrender of Germany and it has been considered that it was more chronologically and factually accurate than his subsequent statements.

Apart from certain observations the information furnished by SCHELLENBERG on the organization and structure of Amt IV and Amt VI has not been included in the Appendices as more accurate details have been available from other sources. In this connection it must be stressed that, taken by and large, SCHELLENBERG has shown himself under interrogation to have little capacity for lucid exposition and to be confused and obscure in his written statements.

INTRODUCTION.

On the 7th Of July 1945 a German who gave his name as Walter Friedrich SCHILLERBERG was admitted for purposes of interrogation to Camp 020.

SCHILLERBERG's name was known to have received a certain prominence in the World Press, not only because of the important position in the C.I.S. that he had held during the greater part of the war, but also on account of the leading part he had played in certain peace negotiations.

Some few days before the capitulation of Germany, SCHILLERBERG had in fact been empowered by the new German Government under Admiral DOENITZ to open negotiations with the Swedish Government with the intention of arranging the surrender of the German forces in the Northern Zone and the opening of peace negotiations with the Western Powers. But SCHILLERBERG's efforts to fulfill his mission were without result as the general capitulation of Germany, including the Northern area, took place before the conclusion of negotiations.

After the cessation of hostilities SCHILLERBERG remained in Sweden and was, at the beginning of June 1945, approached by the American authorities with a view to supplying certain information. It was then put to him that he should place himself at the disposal of the Allies and furnish them with all the information in his possession to which proposal he agreed. On the morning of the 17th of June, therefore, in the company of Count JERNADOTTE he flew in a Dakota to Frankfurt on Main where he was taken in charge by the Allied authorities. On the 7th of July he was flown to London.

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MISCELLANEOUS PERSONALITIES.

Note: SCHELLENBERG provided a large amount of information on personalities, some of which has been omitted from the list given below, as it was either already well-known or too vague to be of any value.

1. ARNOLD, Karl ("Madrid). Had formerly lived in South America. On his return to Germany was trained by Dr. PAEFFGEN personally and became the specialist for the whole courier service to that continent. He directed and supervised all 'Postanlaufstellen (post-boxes)', had established a good organisation in Spanish ports, and was always described by PAEFFGEN as a reliable and painstaking worker. It was due to him that Amt VI received its courier mail to the end. He had built up his own network of agents and ran his own lines, mostly to the Argentine and Brazil. He also provided good reports about the United Kingdom and was in contact with an elderly woman secretary of the United States Embassy in Madrid. About 38 years of age. Formerly an export merchant.
2. CURTH. Journalist. Run by a Referat of Gruppe VIB as an ordinary V-Mann, CURTH came to SCHELLENBERG's notice through the large amount of foreign currency which he expended, without producing information which in any way justified this. The Referat, however, emphasised his importance and especially his indispensability as, with his passport as a permanent courier of the Auswaertiges Amt, he was able to travel over the whole Western area and moreover procured contacts with England direct through Lisbon. SCHELLENBERG therefore arranged to see him personally on his next visit to Berlin, and received an unfavourable impression; he spoke too much about his important contacts, adding that he also worked for the Henko-Dienst of the Auswaertiges Amt, as well as for the Auslandsabt. of the Propagandaministerium and (SCHELLENBERG believes) for the Consul-General in Zurich. From all these Stellen he received considerable amounts of foreign currency. As SCHELLENBERG had nothing definite against him, however, he lulled him into a sense of security and declared himself in complete agreement with his work. Meanwhile he had official enquiries made in his home town (Duesseldorf) from which it appeared that he had already been in trouble with the authorities on account of his Communistic activities and did not enjoy a good reputation. Investigation made in

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2. CURTH (contd.)

Marseilles also proved unfavourable and revealed heavy money expenditure, expensive lady friends whom he gave out to be his 'Mitarbeiter', and suspected homosexuality. Finally, SCHELLENBERG received from the Auswaertiges Amt a report giving the names of the members of the so-called emigre governments in London, with the note that supplementary information could be sent from London but that it would cost a large amount of money, and it was established that CURTH had delivered the same material to Amt VI and the Propaganda-ministerium, giving another source. This would be about the end of 1942 or early 1943, and SCHELLENBERG then proposed that CURTH be arrested and an investigation made on the basis of the evidence available of the supply of false information. This was done, but CURTH was able to escape before the investigation in Paris began, and SCHELLENBERG never heard anything further of him. He learnt subsequently, however, that CURTH must have delivered to the Auswaertiges Amt an enormous amount of information which was probably enemy smoke material.

3. DOENHOFF, Graf.

DOENHOFF was regarded as the successor of DUFFELDT in Switzerland. He enjoyed diplomatic immunity through his position of Consul, and SCHELLENBERG believes that he succeeded in establishing himself in Zurich. This only became possible because in this case Amt VI for once really had the complete support of the Auswaertiges Amt, since DOENHOFF was a close friend of STEINBRACHT. SCHELLENBERG himself only met him when he was leaving Berlin, after he had been trained by STEINLE and PAETGEN. He gave him a fairly exact notion of his political ideas and asked him to work roughly on those lines. DOENHOFF was very surprised as he had never suspected SCHELLENBERG would speak so openly. The latter is unable to say whether he actually did anything in Switzerland or even whether he got there at all right. The only report he remembers from DOENHOFF was one he submitted during his training on the impossible methods employed by the Gestapo and Kripo in the conduct of interrogations of escaped and recaptured British prisoners of war and the bad behaviour of the guard unit. SCHELLENBERG immediately submitted this report to Obergruf. BERGER, head of the P.O. Section, who promised investigation, and also informed HERTEL. The latter at once demanded a report from KLAGER, as suggested by SCHELLENBERG, in order to keep a check on him.

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4. FINKE, August.

Practically no intelligence reports of value were received from FINKE in Sweden, and PAEFFGEN was continually complaining about the deficiency of his information and had demanded his recall on several occasions. He was frequently summoned to Berlin and severely reprimanded, but this had no effect.

Sweden was one of the most important outposts for espionage against Russia, America and England, and in this respect FINKE failed completely. His information was so general and the sources so vague that its value could only be taken collectively. Two or three times he sent several useful messages about convey trains, but SCHELLENBERG is unable to recall any outstanding reports about his political work. However, his reports about the internal position in Sweden, Swedish/Finnish relations and the detailed observation of German/Swedish economic conditions, as a factor in itself as well as in relation to the Western powers, were always good and timely. These successes were essentially due to the co-operation of a large number of honorary assistants whom he had recruited as time went on, and above all to the active collaboration of the Swedish circle centred on the newspaper 'Folkets-Dagblatt', which he financed with money from his own Ministry and from the Auswärtiges Amt. SCHELLENBERG believes that the sum was 12,000 Kroner monthly. This Swedish circle had connections throughout the country and was in Communist and Trade Union circles. SCHELLENBERG repeatedly advised that an attempt should be made to use this channel to obtain information on Russia, and apparently FINKE eventually began to work on this in earnest. He collaborated with Dr. KLEIST on the question of making contact with the Russians and introduced to him a certain RALL (TRALL or some similar name), a platinum dealer who claimed to know STALIN personally and had lived for many years in Russia. It is said, however, that KLEIST made no use of this contact.

In addition, FINKE knew nearly all the German journalists and had countless Germans who, with the help of their Swedish acquaintances, acted as informants; the material they provided, however, was merely of a general nature. His agents included:-

- (a) JOHNSSON. His principal assistant and editor of the 'Folkets-Dagblatt'.
- (b) PENZLIN. His most important collaborator amongst the German journalists.

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4. FINKE, August (contd.)

- (c) KNYFFHAUSEN, Graefin v. Employed as a paid agent at the end of 1943 and in 1944. She obtained information from the society circles in which she moved, and was particularly in contact with the family of the Swede GRAFMAN through whom she secured reports concerning American and English circles in Stockholm. GRAFMAN himself was a member of the Swedish Intelligence Service, and must have had a great deal of money, as he kept a large house and entertained lavishly. The Graefin was separated from her husband, who was said to be in Finland.
- (d) BAUERSFELD.
- (e) Von GENIED.
- (f) Von GOESLER. Leiter of the Railway Personnel Head Office.
- (g) Von der GOLTZ. Banker.

He also had on hand a renegade Russian, formerly a well-known Bolshevik, who had lived for a long time in Germany and was latterly employed in the Japanese Embassy in Stockholm as translator. From time to time he supplied information about Japan, but nothing of value, and SCHELLENBERG believes him to be a Russian agent. FINKE had no genuine contact in any other Embassy, neither did he ever succeed in sending any really important document or report.

Towards the end of his stay in Sweden he was on good terms with DANKWORT, Counsellor of the German Embassy, and they discussed in detail the form in which FINKE should best organise a stay-behind organisation in Sweden for the Auswärtiges Amt. DANKWORT offered FINKE an amount of up to 500,000 Kroner, but nothing ever came of these plans.

After FINKE's expulsion from Sweden, KILLENBRUNER wanted to send him to Zagreb, but SCHILLING protested that this would waste his thorough knowledge and good connections in the North and arranged that he should be attached as an Ober.Rog.Rat. to BEST's staff in Copenhagen, from where he was to try to renew contact with Sweden. FINKE accordingly went to Copenhagen in February or March 1943, using the name SCHILLING (or SCHILLINGS).

MISCELLANEOUS PERSONALITIES - contd.

5. FREUND, Oberst.Lt. Gruppenleiter VI Z, who formerly worked under ROHLEDER and dealt with questions affecting the Balkans. He was an expert on counter-espionage, and SCHELLENBERG chose him for this work because he was less obstinate and argumentative than ROHLEDER. He collaborated closely with Dr. SCHMIDT of the Secretariat, who also made use of him for counter-espionage work at home, and was a valuable colleague vis-a-vis Amt IV, i.e. against MUELLER. The latter nursed a plan to take over the whole of counter-espionage as a Stapo domain, and to hand over this work to the Police Attachés abroad. SCHELLENBERG does not know much about FREUND's work before he joined VI Z, where he was a newcomer, but considers that he must have been specially successful in the Balkans, where he knew all the lines, and that he must have been very efficient, since he was recommended by everybody. Other special territories of his were Switzerland, Spain and Portugal. In Switzerland he worked particularly on the solution of the 'Agent 509' case, and he maintained close contact with Fritz CRAMER in Portugal and with ROHRSCHEIDT in Spain. In the latter country he worked against JOHN and LEDEBUR. He also dealt with an interesting case in Turkey (which was reported by LEVERKUEHN), where a very good agent worked, who was known to the British Intelligence Service as 'Professor'. In Istanbul he dealt with another big case, which concerned the Austrian Freedom Movement and had ramifications in Vienna and the former Semporit Works there.
6. GOERING, Hstuf, Fritz. SCHELLENBERG took GOERING on his personal staff in 1944 on the recommendation of Frl. SCHIENKE, his secretary. GOERING, though married, was hoping to be divorced from his wife and to marry SCHIENKE. He was then about 40 years of age and had previously worked in Amt IV. SCHELLENBERG did not use him for intelligence work: his chief duty was to look after important guests, such as MUSY, in the villa in which he lived. He did, however, on occasion exploit GOERING's former contact with Amt IV to facilitate liaison, and his friendship with BASINSKI, a hotel owner, with a view to using the hotel business for purposes of the G.I.S.
7. HAWEL. HAWEL had lived in the Dutch East Indies as a merchant, and with his experience of the world thus gained had made a great impression on HITLER and RIBBENTROP. SCHELLENBERG, who had made his acquaintance through SPITZI, made various attempts to use him for his own purposes, as he knew that he had HITLER's ear, and at the beginning of 1944 had a long discussion with him, arranged through SPITZI.

MISCELLANEOUS PERSONALITIES - cont'd.

7. HAMEL (cont'd.)

SCHULLENBERG outlined his difficulties in the sphere of foreign politics and with RIBBENTROP, told him that the German treatment of the occupied territories would make almost any form of foreign politics impossible, and asked him if he could influence HITLER towards changing this policy. HAMEL replied that HITLER was no ordinary man but a genius who saw things quite differently, and in this specific matter HITLER's view was that the occupied territories could not be treated in a democratic fashion, but merely as potential sources of war material. SCHULLENBERG suggested that this view might be changed, but HAMEL retorted that he agreed with HITLER, and that in any case the latter regarded himself to such an extent as a historic figure that any of his political utterances must be considered as totally binding and not open to question. SCHULLENBERG realised that he would not get any further with HAMEL, since he was completely under HITLER's spell.

At one time, MUELLER suspected him of espionage; this was in connection with some W/T message which could only have been known to someone in HITLER's immediate entourage, and circumstances might have pointed to HAMEL. However, nothing came of this matter.

After SCHULLENBERG's failure to interest HAMEL in his affairs the latter for a time drew closer to KALTENBUNNER. The reason for this was that KALTENBUNNER had managed to bring him back into the Fuehrer's favour again following a period when he had fallen into disfavour through not having invited Eva Braun to his wedding at the beginning of 1944. SCHULLENBERG had nothing further to do with HAMEL after the middle of 1944.

8. KAULBACH, Oberst. i.G.

Before leaving in the Spring of 1944 to take up his appointment as Military Attaché in Lisbon, KAULBACH paid the routine official visit to SCHULLENBERG, who expounded to him his ideas on the role Military Attachés might play in the G.I.S. He was very responsive and promised to assist with practical suggestions for the implementation of SCHULLENBERG's theories. Between the Spring and Autumn of 1944 he sent him a report on the general political situation in Portugal, and on his return to Germany in the Autumn of 1944 he suggested at a further meeting that the Military Attachés should control the I.S. abroad. SCHULLENBERG did not see him again, nor did he receive further reports.

MISCELLANEOUS PERSONALITIES - contd.

9. KLATT, Richard,
o KANDERS (or KANDERS)
(Source 'ILX'),
Budapest.

This agent was run by Vienna (Oberst WIESE) and worked in the first instance for military intelligence. His reports on Russian army matters were good and were classed as 'important to the Wehrmacht (Heerowichtig)', and the General Staff 'Freunde Heer's Ost' thought highly of him. On air matters they were weak, and on political questions sometimes good and sometimes bad. He was half-Jewish, and the case was very complicated owing to HITLER's strict order that no Jews must be employed on intelligence work. One of his personal enemies was Oberst WIGNER (DELIUS), formerly a Sofia lawyer, in Stuttgart, who alleged that he was working either for the Russians or for the British. KLATT ran his organization very successfully: he had the advantage of working with Ast. Vienna, which supplied deception and play-back material. Finally he became too independent and started working with HOETTL and WANNECK. At that time SCHULLENBERG asked Oberst Lt. OHLETZ, the head of MIL.C. to have a look at his 'shop' in Budapest, which was suspected of covering all sorts of Black Market (exchange and other) illicit deals, but after spending five days on investigations OHLETZ could not find anything suspicious. Then SCHULLENBERG, who had to act quickly before KLATT's collaboration with HOETTL and WANNECK became too close to prevent successful investigations, summoned Oberst WIESE from Vienna and asked him to investigate. The latter found out that the man who in reality provided intelligence for KLATT's racket was a Slovak lawyer and Prince TURKUL. The latter had a White Russian line to Moscow. These lines also led to Istanbul and Bratislava. WIESE arrested KLATT together with twenty-eight small agents, who formed a motley crowd, containing all sorts of nationalities and even a Gypsy man from Vienna. After only a few days it was possible to resume work through KLATT's organization, however, and although for the first week the intelligence declined in value it gradually improved and in the end became excellent. SCHULLENBERG transferred TURKUL (see below) to Berlin to serve as a watch on VLASSOV.

10. KLEIST, Dr. Bruno,
and KLAUS.

Dr. BRUNO KLEIST was used as an expert on Russian affairs by REIBENTROP, KALTENBUNNER, SCHULLENBERG and Oberst WIGNER in Stockholm. Officially he was a Ministerialrat in the Ostministerium. When he was threatened with being called up SCHULLENBERG arranged that he should join the Waffen SS, and then had him posted to the Auswärtiges Amt. He had worked for SCHULLENBERG since 1943, but his close connection with REIBENTROP

MISCELLANEOUS PERSONALITIES - contd.

10. KLEIST, Dr. Bruno,
and KLAUS (contd.)

went back at least to 1939, when he was with HILGER in Moscow. He was a member of the early RIBBENTROP Bureau in company with such men as GARDEMANN and GOTTFREDSEN.

He had with him in Stockholm as his chief agent and assistant a Baltic Jew named KLAUS, who received large sums of money from Oberst WAGNER and, through KLEIST, from RIBBENTROP. In 1944 KLAUS transmitted to WAGNER some sort of peace offer from the Russians. The latter sent it by W/T or cable to G. KLAUS who, being in this respect politically naive, passed it directly to KEITEL, who gave it to HITLER. The latter enquired about the source, and on hearing that he was a Jew immediately issued his celebrated order that Jews were no longer to be employed in the G.I.S. KLAUS' chief Russian contact was SEMENOV in the Russian Embassy in Stockholm. He frequently visited his house and had talks with him. His other Russian contact was ANDREYEV, who was a diplomatic courier who travelled between London and Moscow. SCHELLENBERG had absolutely no confidence in KLAUS' military and political reports, and never met or wanted to meet him. He maintains that RIBBENTROP trusted this obviously unreliable man purely from prejudice and because he wanted to come to terms with the Russians.

Both KLEIST and HILGER gave advice on Russian questions to the Unternehmen Zepplin of Amt VI and particularly to HENGELHAUPT. HILGER was much less helpful than KLEIST and was generally not popular. SCHELLENBERG himself claimed to have maintained contact with the latter in order to be informed of peace negotiations with the East. Amt VI's other advisor on Russian matters was Graf SCHULENBURG, whom SCHELLENBERG knew well but regarded as an ordinary official with no initiative.

11. KRAEGER, Karl Heinz
(Stockholm).

Formerly a Hamburg lawyer. SCHELLENBERG heard his name for the first time from DAUFELDT, for whom he had occasionally worked. He was impressed by his political reports on the U.K. and the U.S.A. for the MIL. INT, and therefore sought closer contact with him. He sent good reports on the situation in the British Foreign Office and the views of the 'Conservative Opposition within the Inner Circle' (ANDERSON). Dr. PAEFFGEN and SCHUIDDENKOPF were very critical of him, alleging that he took his reports from the British Press or the S.I.S. On the other hand Dr. WILSING, one of SCHELLENBERG's most able collaborators and the head of the Zentral bureau, with whom he collaborated in the political domain, thought a great deal of him. He needed a

MISCELLANEOUS PERSONALITIES - contd.

11. KRAEMER, Karl Heinz
(Stockholm) contd.

great deal of money, and in SCHELLENBERG's view this was the reason why he was regarded with suspicion for a long time.

He was first run by MEYENSTUEBEL and later by Oberst.Lt. Von DEWITZ, who was formerly in the Luftwaffenfuhrungsstab and there had differences of opinion with the Ic, Oberst.WODARG. The latter's opposition to DEWITZ transferred itself to KRAEMER, and he ordered his chiefs of sections to compile a comprehensive memorandum alleging that KRAEMER's reports represented conscious deception by the enemy or fraud. This memorandum, comprising nearly eighty pages, was given to MUELLER by WODARG, without consulting SCHELLENBERG, with a request to start proceedings for espionage against KRAEMER. MUELLER put two of his best specialists on the job, and a dispute began between him and SCHELLENBERG. There were a number of weak points in KRAEMER's military reports, e.g. he had reported British aircraft factories which, according to the evidence of British prisoners-of-war, did not exist at all. Another mystery was the time factor in the transmission of his reports. Often, for instance, counter enquiries referring to some remote place in England were answered within ten hours. Finally, after many discussions and negotiations, SCHELLENBERG was himself obliged to summon KRAEMER to Berlin. MUELLER's plan was to arrest him, but SCHELLENBERG prevented this by telling him that in a personal talk with KRAEMER he had succeeded in clearing up the most doubtful issues and that for technical reasons he could not renounce his collaboration. In reality he was important to SCHELLENBERG because of his political reports, and the latter allowed him to leave Germany again. During their conversation he had declared that he would not reveal the names of his collaborators unless SCHELLENBERG was prepared to dispense with his services in the future, but at the same time he offered plausible explanations for his co-operation with Swedish friends. The only thing he revealed was that some of his friends were in the Swedish Foreign Office. He was forbidden to have direct contact with the Luftwaffenfuhrungsstab or other service departments, in order to give no loophole for SCHELLENBERG to be reproached with the fact that he secured at the source important material for a possible exchange of intelligence undertaken by him.

MISCELLANEOUS PERSONALITIES - contd.

11. KRAEMER, Karl Heinz
(Stockholm) contd.

It was KRAEMER's portrayal of events which confirmed SCHELLENBERG in his intention to do everything in Germany itself in the question of the Jews and Church policy to prepare the way for the creation of a Western bloc of states under the leadership of Britain, of which later a crippled Germany would form part. SCHELLENBERG assumed that there must be contact between the 'Conservative Opposition in England', the Vatican, and a Conservative group in France under BIDAULT, which could be exploited by a purged Germany and in this way the basis created for a compromise. All this happened in 1944.

12. KRUEGER.

KRUEGER was a former member of the Dienststelle REIBENTROP, and SCHELLENBERG believes that he was with REIBENTROP in the U.K. He was not a member of the SS, but was a former Hamburg lawyer, about 37 years old, and had not been called up because he was blind in one eye.

He had worked with DAUFELD in VI D, and one day came to SCHELLENBERG with an offer to work for VI W, telling him that he hated REIBENTROP, which predisposed him in his favour. His suggestion was that he should work in a Czech sugar firm and use this concern to build up an I-Service with connections in Switzerland. Permission and approval were obtained from the Reichswirtschaftsministerium, but SCHELLENBERG does not know whether the scheme was successful. He saw KRUEGER for the second time in 1944, when he visited him from Prague and told him that he had Swiss friends who could provide written proofs of REIBENTROP's financial deals in Switzerland, but had made the condition that four Czechs who were in prison in Bratislava should be freed. SCHELLENBERG approved of the deal and got in contact with the Stapoestelle at Bratislava, who maintained that only one of the four was in the prison and agreed to release him. These negotiations took place in January/February 1945, and SCHELLENBERG does not know the outcome. KRUEGER had meanwhile received a letter from a Swiss, a director of a firm engaged in the sugar business, suggesting a meeting in Bodensee. SCHELLENBERG approved of this meeting but did not hear from him again.

KRUEGER spoke good English and was closely connected with DIETZE, who worked in the Propagandaministerium. He was also a close friend of STERNBACH, the auswaertiges Amt, who had helped him and who sympathised with him in his dislike of REIBENTROP.

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MISCELLANEOUS PERSONALITIES - contd.

13. KOENEN, Dr. An Amt VI representative in Tokyo. He was a young lawyer, aged about 32, who had gone to Japan in 1940 to study; he came from a pool of students provided by the SS Mannschaftshaeuser. In Japan where he held some nominal post in the Embassy, he spent money and led an easy life. He produced no results of any kind, and all attempts to make him do any real work for Amt VI failed. He had little or no contact with WEISINGER.
14. MATSU ENDO, Lt. Col. SCHELLENBERG believes that MATSU ENDO worked for ORLETZ and FREUND in connection with the MIL. AMT. He never himself met him and does not believe him to have been important.
15. MIHAILOV, Ivan. This Bulgarian from Macedonia was the leader of the IMRO Movement, and lived for many years as an emigré. His propaganda chief was Dr. TSILEV in Sofia. KALTENBRUNNER and WARNECK had made much ado about him and had overwhelmed him with money and commissions. It was planned:-
- 1) To raise a Macedonian Volunteer Corps to fight against the Greeks in the event of a German retreat. Two thousand men were equipped.
 - 2) To make certain concessions to Bulgaria in Albania.
 - 3) To use MIHAILOV as a factor to maintain order and an instrument through which pressure could be exercised in the field of domestic policy.

From the political aspect this plan was wholly contrary to the ideas of KALTENBRUNNER, a friend of Dr. WEDEMEYER. It led to endless friction, quarrels and difficulties with the other groups Sud-Ost etc. From the intelligence point of view the whole thing was worthless. It cost a great deal of money, and there was reason to assume that Ant. DAVELIC, the Poglovenik in Zagreb, in whose house MIHAILOV had lived for many years, received his share of the proceeds. It remained, however, a top plan of the 'Balkan action lists'.

MISCELLANEOUS PERSONALITIES - contd.16. MIHAILOVIO Drahas

There were numerous intelligence links with MIHAILOVIC. The main lines led to the Ie of the Heeresgruppe Sud-Ost and to the staff of the Minister Dr. NEUBACHER, who had with him officers of the military I.S. (e.g. Kapitän Dr. LANGE, Dr. HAESKER (?)) and many others), as well as Hstuf, Dr. WUEHRER, the liaison officer of Gruppe VI E. HAESKER even claims to have maintained his own W/T personnel at the headquarters of MIHAILOVIC. Military and political opinion as to the importance of MIHAILOVIC differed considerably, and sometimes the former prevailed and sometimes that of NEUBACHER. In addition an important role was played by the Commander of the Sipo and by the HSSUPF, who had views and contacts of their own. SCHELLENBERG believes, however, that NEUBACHER had the best connections.

NEUBACHER was of the firm opinion that he could enter into contact with the British regarding the solution of the MIHAILOVIC questions. The whole issue became pressing in the course of the last months, because he intended to provide arms for about 40,000 volunteers of MIHAILOVIC, in order to win his movement over to Germany and to use it as a fighting unit against Russia and TITO. This plan failed repeatedly owing to the strong resistance of the Wehrmacht, which had no confidence in MIHAILOVIC and his organization, though it was increasingly inclined towards the opinion that he was pursuing not so much a pro-Communist as a pro-British policy. The Wehrmacht categorically refused to arm his troops, maintaining that it did not want to set up an adversary on its flank and in its rear.

Dr. WUEHRER sent via WANNECK numerous reports against Dr. HAESKER, alleging that he was dishonest, had a firm financial hold over NEUBACHER and had used his own position in order to further his own work. He maintained that HAESKER's frequent trips to Switzerland ought to be watched. SCHELLENBERG adds that it was a fact that when HAESKER was in Switzerland in March incoming W/T messages could not be decyphered because he had not handed over the code.

17. PETROW, Rittmeister Von
(T. 100).

A high grade professional intelligence agent who came from the JAHNKE Bureau, with which, SCHELLENBERG believes he maintained his connection to the end. Prior to this he is alleged to have worked for many years for the Japanese Intelligence Service. Through a Jagdschuetz company he had succeeded in obtaining direct contact with HEYDRICH and his Adjutant, a Major POMME and received from that source a salary

APPENDIX XXIII

MISCELLANEOUS PERSONALITIES - contd.

17. PETROW, Rittmeister Von
(T. 100) - contd.

which continued to be paid to him even when he was with KNOCHEN, under whom he worked in Paris for two or three years. SCHELLENBERG had the impression that in Paris he lived well and led KNOCHEN by the nose. He paid one visit to Spain on a mission for KNOCHEN.

Some time in 1941 he paid a visit to Rome, where he visited an old V-Mann who was alleged to have some connection with the American I.S. The Italian Police intervened and arrested this agent. An awkward situation then arose for SCHELLENBERG, because the Amt VI representative in Rome, Dr. GROEBEL, was involved, and SD espionage in Italy had been forbidden by HITLER. Consequently SCHELLENBERG sacked GROEBEL.

PETROW frequently visited SCHELLENBERG bringing political information, the last occasion being in the late Summer of 1944, shortly before he left for Switzerland, where he was going, after having first made various short visits, principally for reasons of his own safety. He was to undertake a mission for KALTENBRUNNER, to whom he had been introduced by SCHEIDLER and who for a long time told everybody that PETROW was working for him in Switzerland. From remarks which SCHEIDLER accidentally let fall, SCHELLENBERG gathered that he must have had a large sum of money paid out to him for the execution of this mission. As he had no means of communication of his own from Switzerland to Germany, however, he relied in Switzerland on DAUFELDT, who had to forward his post to KALTENBRUNNER. Finally a directive was issued that a monthly salary of, SCHELLENBERG believes, 3,000 Francs be paid to PETROW through this channel. SCHELLENBERG does not know whether SCHEIDLER himself ordered this salary direct, or whether the amount was later charged to Amt VI. To STEINLE's great regret, DAUFELDT forwarded all PETROW's letters direct to KALTENBRUNNER. This resulted in a position where often quite unimportant, indeed frequently false or misleading reports from PETROW were immediately made use of by KALTENBRUNNER, who was later unwilling for reasons of prestige, to issue an amended version. Finally KALTENBRUNNER came rather seriously to grief over one of PETROW's reports, and decided that if he returned he must be called severely to account. PETROW played off KALTENBRUNNER and SCHELLENBERG against one another.

MISCELLANEOUS PERSONALITIES - contd.

17. PETROW, Rittmeister Von
(T.100) - contd.
- Formerly PETROW had brought quite good political reviews, but his reports from Switzerland latterly smacked of deception material. SCHELLENBERG had the impression that he was a double agent (although possibly not a conscious one), but had no idea for whom he was primarily working, if for any-one. Whomever he was pressed about his sources and connections he became reticent. SCHELLENBERG had reportedly commissioned VI Z to make an investigation in Switzerland, but there was never any result. He had a wide circle of acquaintances, and his principal sources were mostly South American diplomats. A typical PETROW report was 25 pages long and was based on gossip heard in Switzerland or France. He possessed a Chilean passport and a very rich Jewish-Swiss mistress, FASINACHT, who lived on his estate near Berlin, and speaks French, German, Russian and probably Spanish.
18. RENAU, Dr.
- Dr. RENAU, a typical civil servant who had worked in Amt IV, first in the Grenzpolizei and then in Spionage-Abwehr, was seconded to assist SCHELLENBERG in his negotiations with Count BERNADOTTE, after the former had asked HIMMLER to tell KALTENBRUNNER to appoint an Amt IV man with full powers to arrange releases of prisoners which had been agreed with BERNADOTTE. RENAU was particularly helpful and co-operative throughout the negotiations and had established friendly relations with the Danish Minister, Dr. WAASS. With his wife and daughter he escaped to Sweden in SCHELLENBERG's party, as a result of BERNADOTTE's appreciation of his helpfulness. MUELLER knew of his appointment, but had no further contact with him: he certainly did not know in advance of his official escape to Sweden.
19. SALGADO, Plinio y,
and ALBUQUERQUE
(LISBON).
- SALGADO's co-operation with the G.I.U. was essentially political: he was to supply political intelligence from Brazil in return for assistance in his ambition to overthrow the existing government and become Head of State himself.
- ALBUQUERQUE, his secretary, on the other hand, worked for NASSENSTEIN. His reports covered various fields and SCHELLENBERG considers it likely that they included shipping information. He saw them both in Lisbon in 1941 or 1942.

MISCELLANEOUS PERSONALITIES - contd.20. SCHWARZ v. BERCK

SCHELLEBERG was introduced to SCHWARZ v. BERCK by STEINLE at the beginning of 1944, or possibly the end of 1943. BERCK wished to further the co-operation between Amt VI and the Propagandaministerium, i.e. he wanted to receive political reports, as his Minister was continually complaining of the scanty information supplied by the Auswaertiges Amt. As at that time his stock stood very high with GOEBBELS on account of his political articles in the 'Reich', SCHELLEBERG permitted STEINLE to give him now and again several items of information direct at the Propagandaministerium, and not through the liaison officer of Amt VI. In return GOEBBELS was at last to cancel his refusal to allow foreign journalists to work for the I.S. Furthermore, the intelligence channels of Amt VI would be placed at the disposal of the Propagandaministerium for the launching of secret propaganda (Here SCHELLEBERG remarks that for anyone who knew the internal conditions the fact that the Propagandaministerium desired this form of collaboration was nothing but proof of the rivalry which existed between its Auslaendrabtl. and the Kulturabt. of the Auswaertiges Amt). STEINLE's co-operation with v. BERCK did not last very long, nor was it very intensive; the latter showed too clearly that he required the information in the first instance for his journalistic articles. In the last half year, if not for longer, STEINLE made no mention of the name to SCHELLEBERG, who knows nothing of v. BERCK's journey to Spain, possibly on the orders of Amt VI: he cannot believe that STEINLE would have instigated such a mission without informing him. He himself saw him only once, or at the most twice, after their initial meeting, and had done so in order to put a stop to the complaints which GOEBBELS was always making against CANARIS and himself.

He considers that v. BERCK was never interesting from an intelligence point of view, and that only in the internal political game was he of a certain importance. He was a very close personal friend of MUELLER, and in the last year was the advocate of a whispering campaign in Germany to the effect that an alliance with Russia and the formation of a Soviet Germany would be advantageous. He very skilfully explained away the danger of the above by saying that it was only to make an impression on the Western powers. In effect, however, this propaganda worked out in the main pro-Soviet.

MISCELLANEOUS PERSONALITIES - contd.21. SONNENHOL

SONNENHOL was a Legationsrat in the Auswaertiges Amt and a member of the SS; as such, he worked for some considerable time for Amt VI in an honorary capacity. He was a personal friend of STEINLE, who was able to recruit him for co-operation in a particularly binding form. SONNENHOL, who was concerned almost exclusively with Western affairs, was a connoisseur of the French situation, and as such very useful to STEINLE. Therefore, when he went to Switzerland he made an agreement with STEINLE that he would make him privy to his reports to the Auswaertiges Amt. In special cases, in which it seemed certain that they would not fall on very receptive ground in the Auswaertiges Amt he would give the reports only to him. Such more or less was the agreement according to STEINLE, and SCHELLENBERG believes that he once mentioned that he received both written and verbal reports from SONNENHOL. One day SCHELLENBERG heard from Legationsrat REICHEL (or REICHEL) in the Auswaertiges Amt that SONNENHOL was sending very interesting reports from Switzerland, from where good links might be worked up with France, via government circles. Unfortunately these reports were all pigeon-holed in the Auswaertiges Amt, and it was said that nothing could come of them. One of the reasons for this was possibly that it appeared from them that in France, as in other foreign countries, further developments in the SS. organisation were being followed with great interest, since in its position of power the SS. might one day even dissolve the Party and attempt to make peace with the Western powers. SCHELLENBERG informed STEINLE of the position and asked him to get into contact personally with REICHEL, whom he knew well and who might possibly be able to get this report for Amt VI; moreover, SCHELLENBERG hinted that he was very displeased with SONNENHOL, and asked STEINLE to tell him to come to Berlin, since he was particularly interested in these questions of high politics. SCHELLENBERG also gave REICHEL, who was going to Switzerland at that time with his tacit consent, the mission of ordering SONNENHOL to Berlin. REICHEL, who had an especially good contact with the Swiss Embassy in Berlin and also knew leading Swiss industrialists, was in addition to endeavour to get into touch with English circles, since SCHELLENBERG hoped, by the time he had established such contact, to have got so far as to be able to offer a cessation of hostilities by Germany. He heard no more from REICHEL, however, nor did he have any further contact with SONNENHOL.

MISCELLANEOUS PERSONALITIES - contd.22. TURKUL, Prince.

SCHULLENBERG last saw Prince TURKUL about the time the VLASSOV Committee was formed. He did so at the instigation of OHLETZ, the Abteilungschef of MIL.C, who was working on the KLATT affair (see No.9 above), of which TURKUL was one of the chief figures. The object was to thank him personally for all he had done, thus encouraging him to continue to work despite the increasingly difficult political position, and to give him the opportunity he desired of discussing the VLASSOV problem with SCHULLENBERG. The conference, at which TURKUL was accompanied by his Adjutant, was rather long and dealt in detail with the problem of Bolshevism. TURKUL enumerated the mistakes made against the Russians, above all in the Occupied areas, and pointed out the changes in internal policy inaugurated by STALIN, i.e. the trend towards nationalism and the encouragement of religion. VLASSOV, he maintained, had not followed these developments within Russia but, like the Russian P.O.W's in Germany, had remained true to the Bolshevistic creed of 1941. To this he convincingly traced back fundamental mistakes in the manifesto which VLASSOV had proclaimed in Prague, viz. the failure to mention the Church question and the use of the phrase 'The Russian peoples' instead of 'Russia': owing to these defects the VLASSOV movement no longer had any influence in Russia, and thus did not fulfil the purpose for which it had been formed. He added that it was not necessary to start such a large movement and give VLASSOV concessions in domestic politics (independent tribunals), which were not without danger, merely to influence the Russian P.O.W's in Germany.

TURKUL asked SCHULLENBERG to submit his views to the right quarters and to try to arrange for him to be included in the joint action with a position of responsibility, preferably that of an independent divisional General with a seat on and a voice in the Committee. He further suggested that the old proved White Russian officers, who were fighting in closed formation in the Balkans, should be disbanded and ranged alongside the new divisions to be formed as security elements. In parts these ideas seemed sound to SCHULLENBERG who promised him full support and in addition told him that he would be specially grateful if he would keep him posted concerning his views on the VLASSOV affair;

MISCELLANEOUS PERSONALITIES - contd.22. TURKUL, Prince (contd.)

TURKUL fully understood what he meant by that. SCHELLENBERG informed Obergruf. BERGER of his discussion, and the latter promised to consider all aspects in detail with his colleagues. TURKUL expressed his opinions to VLASSOV, both in Berlin and in Prague, with complete frankness, but they were unable to arrive at any real compromise between their divergent views.

During the last months of the war TURKUL lived either in Salzburg itself or in the neighbourhood, in quarters procured for him by M.L.C. After some considerable time had elapsed SCHELLENBERG received a letter from him in which he asked for permission to form a division with all the Russians who had proved themselves loyal to him, in order to fight Bolshevism (which was apparently not yet dead!) to the bitter end. SCHELLENBERG instructed GULETZ to reply with a polite gesture, and never heard anything further from him.

23. TASSIGNY, General
DE LATRE DE

In February, 1945, an SS-Obergruppenfuehrer who had a command on the Upper Rhine front (possibly HAUSSER) sent a courier with a dispatch to HILBLER, stating that two or three SS men had had contact with some French political representatives who had suggested that discussions could be arranged with General DE LATRE DE TASSIGNY with a view to the formation of a Western bloc. HILBLER forwarded this dispatch to SCHELLENBERG for comment and action. The latter found out that the SS men concerned were in fact members of an SD Dienststelle near Loerrach on the South-Western part of the front and forwarded the dispatch to STEINLE with an angry covering note pointing out that it was typical of the disorganisation of Amt VI in the South that such despatches should reach the Amtschef by such indirect route. He received no answer from STEINLE.

SCHLENNBERG remembers having heard the General's name mentioned in the winter of 1944 as connected with some similar alleged peace negotiations. BICKLER was in charge of the alleged liaison at this time.

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